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I. REIMAGINING WORK AND THE EROSION OF WORK STRUCTURES
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution the social arrangements through
which people do productive work have changed. Sometimes changes in the
technology or organization of work sufficiently alter work practices so that they
themselves are revolutionary. Most recently, microelectronic technological
innovations, the globalization of work, and the development of multinational
capital markets have had revolutionary consequences by permitting capital to
achieve and hence to pursue unlimited profits. In the last decades of the
twentieth century, this pursuit has ushered in such startling changes in
employment practices that reimagining work has become a minor industry.
Social scientists and management scholars predict the externalization of work
and the erosion of the employer-employee relationship,' and with them the
elimination of jobs as we know them. 2  The celebrants of these changes
envision workers with the same goal as their employers-attaining enormous
wealth-and the same chance to realize their goal. They imagine workers in
the new economy as free agents who voluntarily string together a series of
contractual exchanges of work for compensation into a career. In the process,
and through investment markets and e-commerce, workers will supposedly
achieve economic security, independent of a particular employer.
Observers also emphasize debureaucratization and the disappearance of
hierarchy in work organizations.3 The prototypical work organization in this
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1. See generally Jeffrey Pfeffer & James N. Baron, Taking the Workers Back Out: Recent Trends in
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2. Kevin T. Leicht, Work (If You Can Get It) and Occupations (If There Are Any)? What Social
Scientists Can Learn from Predictions of the End of Work and Radical Workplace Change, 25 WORK &
OCCUPATIONs 36 (1998).
3. See. e.g., Paul DiMaggio, The Future of the Firm (paper presented at the Second Annual
Conference on Economic Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, March 4, 2000); Mark Granovetter,
Economic Sociology at the Crossroads (paper presented at the Second Annual Conference on Economic
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fantasy resembles a Silicon Valley startup, with a flat organizational structure
in which a relatively homogeneous group of workers perform similar jobs,4
work cooperatively as peers, and share the benefits of breakthroughs. In
addition, social scientists predict that social capital, by which they mean social
networks, will be the key for success in this brave new world of work. Thus,
despite the valorization of rugged individualism in the new economy, success
still comes to the well connected.
Regardless of how pervasive the phenomena are in these visions, their
existence and glorification as the embodiment of a brave, new workplace have
alarming implications for the creation of work without exclusionary barriers.
Consider the elimination of hierarchy. Organizations can indeed become flatter
by combining job categories or compressing job ladders, and some have done
so. 5 But flatter organizations also mean the compression or elimination of job
ladders that have provided to white women and minority women and men a
path from jobs as laborers, bank tellers, and reservation clerks to more
rewarding positions. Although glass ceilings have prevented members of these
groups from using job ladders to reach the top organizational strata, the
elimination of those ladders will further lower the ceilings. The disappearance
of formal hierarchical structures does not necessarily mean the disappearance
of hierarchy. In some cases, hierarchy is outsourced when firms outsource low-
prestige functions like security, cleaning, mailing, and human resources. This
flattens hierarchies within establishments, by replacing them with cross-
establishment hierarchy. Moreover, in flattened organizations hierarchy moves
behind the scenes, thus increasing the importance of informal social networks
for determining who gets what.
The erosion of workplace bureaucracies threatens the careers of the
traditionally excluded. Bureaucracy within work organizations is expressed
primarily in written rules that govern employers' and employees' rights and
responsibilities regarding their employment relationship. These include the
specification of necessary job qualifications, the definition of job families and
job ladders, promotion and transfer policies, evaluation criteria and procedures,
entitlement to benefits, cause for termination, and the like. It is through these
formal policies and their accompanying structures that workers obtain due-
process protections. As I argue below, formal rules check caprice and
favoritism. Although people who belong to the group that makes the rules
4. Peripheral functions have been outsourced. Pfeffer & Baron, supra note 1, at 269; Sharon R.
Cohany et al., Counting the Workers: Results of a First Survey, in CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 41, 49, 58 (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds.,
1998).
5. Outsourcing low-prestige functions like security, cleaning, mailing, and human resources helps
to flatten hierarchies within organizations, although it does not reduce inequality in the workforce as a
whole, it just concentrates nonstandard workers in different and less desirable work arrangements. See
Pfeffer & Baron, supra note 1, at 269, 270, 274; Ame Kalleberg, Barbara Reskin & Ken Hudson, Bad
Jobs in America, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 256, 264 (2000).
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rarely need formal rules to advance in their careers, the traditionally excluded
• 6
derive their rights and protections from organizational bureaucracies.
The replacement of the standard employer-employee relationship, the
model organization of work in the last half of the 20th century, with more
"flexible" arrangements also threatens to exacerbate race- and sex-based
exclusion. The standard employment arrangement, which came into its own in
the middle of the twentieth century, is characterized by the exchange of a
worker's labor for monetary compensation by an employer, with work
performed on a fixed schedule, at the employer's place of business, under the
employer's control, and with the mutual expectation of continued
employment. 7  It is through this standard employment relationship that the
government protects workers from dangerous working conditions, unfair
treatment and discrimination, and the vicissitudes of unemployment. Through
it the government provides family and medical leave and social security to
some Americans. Thus, the standard employment relation can be seen as a
work structure that provides certain protections to workers.
In sum, trends that have been attributed to the new economy involve the
erosion of employment structures-practices and policies that govern the
allocation of employment and job rewards. Seniority-based promotion
systems, academic tenure, and professional partnership all exemplify work
structures that can protect the marginalized--or at least those members of
marginalized groups who obtain jobs under their protection. 8  Thus,
employment structures are critical for ensuring equal access for marginalized
9
groups.
II. WHY WORK STRUCTURES ARE CRITICAL FOR MARGINALIZED GROUPS
Work structures are essential for protecting members of marginalized
groups for several reasons. In the first place, work structures make visible and
public the "rules" (e.g., job posting, job descriptions) one needs to survive and
succeed at work. Their visibility also signals an employer's public values with
respect to uniform treatment, fairness, and the like. For example, the existence
6. Externalization of work-independent contracting, outsourcing, and the like-has narrowed the
reach of bureaucratic work structures. Kalleberg et a]., supra note 5, at 274.
7. Kalleberg et al., supra note 5, at 257-58.
8. Just as tenure-track jobs are increasingly outside the reach of some academics who must settle
for contingent work that provides no job security, low pay, and few if any benefits, law firm associates
increasingly find themselves as permanent employees rather than equity partners. Elizabeth H. Gorman,
Up-Or-Out Contracts in Law Firms: Promotion or Dismissal in the Context of Knowledge-Intensive
Services (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
9. It is no coincidence that these protective structures are at risk when people of color and white
women can finally draw on their protections. To paraphrase Carter and Carter, once women and
minorities got a ticket to ride, the gravy train stopped running. Michael J. Carter & Susan Boslego
Carter, Women's Recent Progress in the Professions or, Women Get A Ticket to Ride After The Gravy
Train Has Left The Station, 7 FEMINIST STUD. 477, 500-01 (1981).
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of job ladders signals to workers that their employer rewards satisfactory
performance with a promotion, while the absence of promotion structures
makes workers pessimistic about their promotion chances.1l By the same
token, structures make inequities visible, because they permit workers to
compare the outcomes of similarly-qualified members of different groups.
Structures often link performance, performance evaluation, and rewards: what
are normally perquisites for insiders become entitlements for those-and only
for those-who meet performance standards. For example, job ladders signal
who is potentially eligible to move up. Third, structures limit discretionary
behavior by gatekeepers. For example, blind auditions markedly increased
women's participation in major symphony orchestras."' The use of a physical
structure-a screen-during auditions increased women's share of new hires in
symphony orchestras by 30 percent between 1970 and 1996! Fourth, structures
can trump custom-a major force for business as usual. In recognition of this,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission literally restructured
segregated eating facilities and restrooms in formerly segregated southern plant
in the Civil Rights era to preclude de facto segregation from replacing that
mandated by company policy. 12 Finally, structures can provide mechanisms to
challenge illegitimate treatment, such as appeals processes.
Structures are essential for controlling discrimination. They are
particularly important because-as I argue in the next section-many of the
actions that give rise to the exclusion of men and women of color and white
women are not intentional; they stem from automatic, unconscious cognitive
processes. This means that the good intentions of workplace decisionmakers
are not sufficient to prevent the discriminatory results of cognitive biases. The
only real safeguards are structural.
III. NONCONSCIOUS ORIGINS OF DISCRIMINATION
Despite the existence of regulations designed to check discrimination and
the establishment of public agencies charged with administering those
regulations, social scientists continue to document pervasive employment
discrimination based on gender and race. To the credit of employers, workers,
and regulatory agencies, men and women of color and white women have made
headway in their access to and rewards for employment since major federal
anti-discrimination regulations were enacted in the 1960s. Nonetheless, recent
10. Sex differences in the importance of being promoted stem from women's lower likelihood of
holding jobs that have promotion structures. Naomi R. Cassirer & Barbara Reskin, High Hopes:
Organizational Position, Employment Experiences, and Women's and Men's Promotion Aspirations, 27
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 438,458 (2000).
11. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions
on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 715-41 (2000).
12. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 9 (1990).
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strong evidence documents the persistence of race and sex discrimination
which excludes people from some jobs and restricts them to occupational
ghettos, reduces their on-the-job autonomy and authority, and lowers their pay.
In more than 2,000 audits, employers discriminated against minorities between
one-fourth and one-fifth of the time, favoring whites in invitations to interview,
job offers, compensation, job assignments, and information about unadvertised
opportunities.' 3  Applicants with white-sounding names who replied to
classified ads were half again as likely as those with black-sounding names to
get call-backs from employers. 14  Additional evidence of on-going
discrimination comes from an innovative study that uses 1997 EEO-1 data to
assess firms' underemployment of women or blacks compared to others in the
same industry and location that employ workers in the same occupations.
5
Consistent with the above evidence of sustained race and sex discrimination are
employers' admission of their aversion to employing people of color. 16
Discrimination persists, I contend, because our remedies for it are
inadequate. And they are inadequate because the paradigmatic conception of
discrimination ignores one of its fundamental causes. Based on my work as an
expert witness in discrimination cases, I came to doubt the adequacy of the
conventional view of discrimination as conscious hostile acts motivated by
antipathy. I soon learned that others who had worked as experts or attorneys
have drawn the same conclusion I reached: normal, nonconscious, automatic
cognitive processes of which we are unaware and which we do not consciously
intend routinely gives rise to discrimination in employment. 17  Thus, after
reviewing evidence that much employment discrimination originates in
automatic cognitive processes, I concluded that we must expand the
13. Michael Fix, George C. Galster, & Raymond J. Struyk, An Overview of Auditing for
Discrimination, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICA 1, 18-25 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993); G. Kenney & D. A. Wissoker, An
Analysis of the Correlates of Discrimination Facing Young Hispanic Job Seekers, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
674, 676-77 (1994); Mark Bendick, Social Policy 2000: Affirmative Action, 22 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN.
1212 (1999).
14. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Brendan More Employable than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (2002) (unpublished paper, on
file with author).
15. Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Employment Discrimination Against Women in Washington State,
1997, 3 EMP. DISCRIMINATION PROJECT REP. (1998).
16. See, e.g., Irene Browne & Cynthia Hewitt, Networks, Discrimination or Location? Explaining
Job Segregation Among African Americans, Presented at the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality
Conference on Searching for Work, Searching for Workers, Russell Sage Foundation, New York
(September 1995); Philip S. Kasinitz & Jan Rosenberg, Missing the Connection: Social Isolation and
Employment on the Brooklyn Waterfront, 43 SoC. PROBS. 180, 190-91 (1996); Ivy Kennelly, You've Got
That Single Mother Element: Employers' Images of African American Women, 13 GENDER & SOC'Y
168, 177 (1999); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE NEW WORLD OF THE
URBAN POOR 112-37 (1996); Phillip Moss & Chris Tilly, Soft Skills and Race: An Investigation of Black
Men's Employment Problems, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 252, 264 (1996).
17. William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 120,
121-22 (2000); Laura H. Krieger, The Contents of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STANFORD L. REV. 1161 (1995).
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paradigmatic understanding of discrimination in order to effectively control it.
Ironically, the interventions that can control discrimination originating in
nonconscious cognitive processes are particularly threatened by the
restructuring of work.
I focus here on two key cognitive processes that-unless checked-can
give rise to discrimination: ingroup favoritism and stereotyping. These
unconscious, automatic processes lead to "micro" acts of discrimination such as
social exclusion, the denial of opportunities to acquire skills, unnoticed
contributions, and unwarranted reprimands. Victims may not identify these acts
as discriminatory and the data available to social scientists do not capture them
as well as they capture discrimination in consequential employment "events"--
the denial of employment or a promotion, a segregated job assignment, or an
unwarranted termination-which tend to be the focus of most scientific
assessments of the extent of discrimination and of federal anti-discrimination
regulations.
IV. CATEGORIZATION, INGROUP FAVORITISM, AND STEREOTYPING
Both ingroup favoritism and stereotyping stem from an apparently natural
and generally adaptive cognitive process: the categorization of "cognitive
objects" (i.e., people, things). 18 A large body of scholarship indicates that we
are able and willing to categorize others on the most trivial dimensions and that
once categorization has occurred, we distinguish ingroups (others with whom
we share the pronoun "we") from outgroups ("they").19  In a related
phenomenon, we tend to exaggerate outgroup homogeneity ("all of them are
alike"), 20 and to exaggerate differences between in- and outgroups on
dimensions that favor our own group and minimize those that do not.
21
A. Ingroup favoritism
The distinction we make between others like and unlike ourselves is
automatic and largely outside our awareness or control; it involves fundamental
processes such as what we store and recall about others. For instance, even
when the same information is provided about members of ingroups and
22
outgroups, subjects do not retain the same information about them. In- versus
18. Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 554, 556-58 (D.T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
19. Rothbart & Lewis, Cognitive Processes and Intergroup Relations: A Historical Perspective, in
SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 347-82 (Patricia Devine et al. eds., 1993).
20. However, when the ingroup is small, members show ingroup homogeneity. Brewer & Brown,
supra note 18, at 558.
21. Id. at 570; Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 372 (D.T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
22. Rothbart & Lewis, supra note 19, at 369.
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outgroup membership defines the pool of those to whom people are attracted,
with whom they seek equal treatment, and who serve as their reference group.23
We evaluate ingroup members more positively than outgroup members, trust
them more, have more positive feelings for them, and are inclined to cooperate
24
with them rather than competing. For example, we readily assess nonsense
words paired with "us" and "we" more favorably than those paired with "them"
and "they.,
25
In addition, what we expect of others depends on whether they are
outgroup and ingroup members: we anticipate positive behaviors by ingroup
members and negative behaviors by outgroup members. 26 Observers assess
others' performance and account for their successes and failures. 27 Descriptive
stereotypes affect observers' expectations and hence the explanations they
construct. When the actions of others conform to our expectations, we tend to
attribute their behavior to stable, internal propensities (e.g., ability), while we
attribute actions that are inconsistent with our stereotype-based expectations to
situational (i.e., external) or transient factors (e.g., task difficulty, luck, or
effort). In this way, stereotype-based expectations give rise to biased
attributions. For example, given the stereotype that men are good at
customarily male tasks, competent performance by men doesn't require an
explanation; men's failures do, however, and observers tend to attribute these
unexpected outcomes to situational factors such as bad luck or lack of effort,
none of which predict future failure. In contrast, women are stereotypically not
expected to do well at customarily male endeavors, so explaining their failure is
easy: They lack the requisite ability (an internal trait) and hence are likely to
fail in the future. In contrast, their successes are unexpected, so they must have
resulted from situational factors that do not predict future success. Moreover,
in the attributions we make to account for others' behavior, we tend to attribute
expected behavior to internal dispositions and unexpected behavior to external
situations. Thus, we would attribute failure by an ingroup member and success
by an outgroup member-both unexpected outcomes-to the situation, but
credit success by an ingroup member and failure by an outgroup member-
both expected outcomes-to their own dispositions. These propensities
preserve our impressions of ingroup members as superior to outgroup
members.
23. James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology of Organizations and Inequality, 57
SoC. PSYCH. Q. 190, 192-93 (1994).
24. Brewer & Brown, supra note 18, at 559.
25. Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of Intergroup
Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475,475 (1990).
26. Brewer & Brown, supra note 18, at 560.
27. Crocker, Major & Steele, Social Stigma, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 504, 539
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
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The consequences of ingroup favoritism resemble what we would expect
from differential treatment based on outgroup antagonism. 28 The differences
are that the former is less subject to personal control than the latter, and that
vastly more people are affected by the former than the latter. While a minority
of Americans harbor sufficiently strong antipathy toward an outgroup to
purposively avoid them at work, ingroup preference appears to be an almost
universal phenomenon. As a result, ingroup preference is an important source
of discrimination in the workplace. Brewer and her colleagues claimed that
much of what social scientists and legal scholars construe (and what workers
experience) as discrimination against outgroups originates not in animus
toward an outgroup but in preference for others like ourselves. 29 Rather than
being targets of animosity to ingroup members, outgroup members are invisible
to the ingroup.
The small and large advantages that people receive from ingroup members
contribute importantly to their success.3 °  Of course, if membership in
influential ingroups were independent of sex and race, then ingroup
favoritism-while unfair-would not contribute to sex- and race-based
inequality. But in an already sex- and race-stratified society, white European-
ancestry men dominate posts as decisionmakers or informal gatekeepers who
control opportunities that can enhance careers, and hence are best able to favor
members of their ingroups. The substantial underrepresentation of women of
all races and men of color in predominantly white, predominantly male posts in
the top echelons in the corporate world, in law firms, in the academe, and in the
skilled trades is consistent with the operation of high levels of ingroup
favoritism in which white men benefit from being helped or selected because of
their race and sex-in DiTomaso's language, from "affirmative inclusion.",
3 1
My experience as an expert witness has illustrated the importance of
ingroup favoritism for creating outgroup disadvantage. Search committees and
managers may not consciously reject women or people of color because of their
sex or race; none comes to mind during brainstorming sessions to develop a
pool of candidates. Being the wrong sex or race excludes women and
minorities by rendering their accomplishments invisible and distorting others'
perceptions and evaluations of them, including their expectations of and
explanations for women's and minorities' successes and failures.
28. As Alejandro Portes put it, "your community is my exclusion." Comment during a discussion
of papers at the University of Pennsylvania Conference on Economic Sociology (March 4, 2000).
29. See, e.g., Brewer & Brown, supra note 18, at 566.
30. Nancy DiTomaso, Why Anti-Discrimination Policies Are Not Enough: The Legacies and
Consequences of Affirmative Inclusion-for Whites. Presented at the 95th annual meeting of the
American Sociological Association, August 16, Anaheim, CA (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
31. Id. at I.
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B. Sex and race stereotyping
The other important way that categorization gives rise to potentially
discriminatory cognitive distortions and biases is sex and race stereotyping.
We can think of stereotypes as habits of thought (as habits, they are overleamed
and automatic) or as implicit theories that link group membership to personal
32
attributes. Although we are aware of some of our stereotypes (I know, for
example, that I consciously stereotype students with green hair, nose rings, and
large tattoos as nonstudious and hence must struggle not to treat them
differently), it is unconscious stereotypes that I emphasize here. When we
encounter a person, the traits that are stereotypically associated with her/his
group membership automatically come to mind-including stereotypes that we
consciously reject as unfounded.33 The automatic nature of stereotyping helps
to maintain stereotypes, despite evidence that they are inaccurate. In fact, we
automatically pursue, prefer, and remember acts that support our stereotypes
(including remembering "events" that did not occur), and we ignore, discount,
and forget acts that challenge them.34 We process information that conforms to
their stereotypes more quickly than inconsistent information, and we are more
likely to stereotype when we are under time pressure, partly because
stereotyping conserves mental resources.
35
Unconscious stereotyping can lead to discrimination because it affects our
impressions and judgments of others. For example, people can more quickly
pair positive words with "white" than "black," even when the stimulus term
"black" is presented subliminally. 36  When we do not have complete
information about others that we need for making decisions, we automatically
draw on stereotypes to fill in the blanks. Importantly, these invisible
assumptions can be the basis for our actions. For example, employers lacking
objective information about the career commitment of a young woman are
likely to assume that she is less committed than a man with similar credentials.
Indeed, according to Browne and Kennelly, Atlanta employers admitted that
they were reluctant to employ African American women because they assumed
that they were single mothers a7  Brooklyn employers assumed that African
American women who lived nearby would attract their boyfriends and children
32. Barbara F. Reskin, Rethinking Employment Discrimination, in THE NEW ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY 218,223 (Mauro F. Guillen et al. eds., 2002).
33. Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Stereotypes in Thought and Deed. Social Cognitive Origins of
Intergroup Discrimination, in INTERGROUP COGNITION AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIORS 311-35
(Constantine Sedikides et al. eds., 1998).
34. Fiske, supra note 21, at 367.
35. Id. at 366.
36. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup Bias, in
AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 180-85 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
37. Irene Browne & Ivy Kennelly, Stereotypes and Realities: Images of Black Women in the Labor
Market, in LATINAS AND AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AT WORK: RACE, GENDER, AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 302, 313-19 (Irene Browne ed., 1999).
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to the workplace. 38 And law firms that list stereotypically male attributes (e.g.,
assertiveness) among the criteria for choosing associates hired
disproportionately more males, while firms that listed stereotypically female
traits (e.g., interpersonal skills) hired disproportionately more females.39
Considerable research has established that anything that highlights group
membership primes stereotypes, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will
be invoked. 40 For example, Devine showed that subjects who were
subliminally exposed to words stereotypically linked to African Americans but
which were unrelated to hostility (e.g., jazz) were more likely to interpret
ambiguous behavior by blacks as hostile than were those whose stereotypes
about African Americans were not primed before they were presented with the
ambiguous behavior. 41  Thus, an idle remark about skirt lengths or pro-
basketball can activate sex or race stereotypes, and activated stereotypes can
distort decisionmakers' assessments.
Importantly, diversity training-which has displaced affirmative action in
American corporations-is likely to prime stereotypes and hence make
treatment based on sex or race more likely.42 "Celebrating our differences" at
work activates stereotypes associated with the groups to which we belong.43
According to laboratory experiments, people can temporarily suppress
stereotyping when they are instructed to do so, but suppression is followed by a
rebound in which people display more stereotyping than members of a control
group that was not instructed not to stereotype 4  Research also demonstrates
that we stereotype more when we are under time pressures or are engaged in
45complex tasks that tax our cognitive resources.
In sum, stereotyping and ingroup favoritism act automatically at the
preconscious level in ways that disadvantage women and people of color. They
endure because they are cognitively efficient. By freeing us to concentrate our
attentions on the stimuli that are consequential for outcomes that matter to us,
they permit us to process complex stimuli automatically. Given their efficiency
for individuals-and their presumed advantage for dominant groups-they are
difficult to eradicate. Given their automaticity and their nature, they distort and
38. Kasinitz & Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 190.
39. Elizabeth H. Gorman, Gender and Organizational Selection Decisions: Evidence from Law
Firms 169 (2001) (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, on file with author).
40. Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and
What We Don't Know, 10 J. Soc. ISSUES 3 (1995); Fiske, supra note 21, at 366.
41. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components,
56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 12 (1989).
42. See Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management:
Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BFHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 971-76
(1998) (describing the transformation of affirmative action programs into diversity programs).
43. The mention of affirmative action may have this effect. See Madeline E. Heilman, Affirmative
Action: Some Unintended Consequences for Working Women, 16 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
125, 142-54 (1994).
44. Bodenhausen et al., supra note 33, at 326.
45. Fiske, supra note 21, at 366.
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hence bias our impressions and evaluations of others. Thus, their likely effect
is sex and race discrimination. Fortunately, these discriminatory effects can be
minimized, however, through employment structures, the topic to which I now
turn.
V. EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURES THAT MINIMIZE THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS
OF NONCONSCIOUS COGNITIVE PROCESSES
Work organizations cannot eradicate people's automatic propensity to
categorize others into ingroups and outgroups. And organizations' attempts to
eliminate stereotyping can backfire.4 6 However, employers can prevent these
cognitive processes from biasing employment decisions and hence causing
discrimination against people of color and white women.47 They can do this-
and some do-by formalizing personnel practices and holding decisionmakers
accountable for any discriminatory effects. In other words, employment
practices can curtail, permit, or exacerbate the effects of normal intrapsychic
processes. Thus, while work structures can forestall the discriminatory
consequences of cognitive processes-and even of some intentional
discrimination-they can also invite employment discrimination. Consider
word-of-mouth recruiting). Because informal networks are often based on sex,
race, ethnicity, and other personal characteristics, organizations' use of
workers' personal social networks to identify candidates for jobs, promotions,
membership on a task force, and the like almost always excludes for
outsiders.4 8 One consequence is seen in the effect of using informal networks
to recruit managers. Across a national sample of work organizations, the
greater employers' reliance on informal networks to recruit managers, the
lower women's share of managerial jobs.4 9 In short, the presence or absence
and the form of work structures strongly influence the levels of employment
discrimination in a workplace. Organizational sociologists have identified
organizational characteristics and employment practices that affect levels of
sex- and race-based ascription or discrimination. Social cognition research also
points to employment practices that can minimize or exacerbate the biasing
effects of social cognition processes. In this section, I draw on these literatures
46. Brewer & Brown, supra note 18, at 566.
47. Fiske, supra note 21, at 375.
48. Jomills Henry Braddock 11 & James M. McPartland, How Minorities Continue to be Excluded
from Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J.
SOC. ISSUES 5, 8-12 (1987) (use of informal social networks may impede equal access to jobs for
blacks); Nan Lin, Inequality in Social Capital, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 785, 787-88 (2000); Trond Peterson
et al., Offering a Job: Meritocracy and Social Networks, 106 AM. J. Soc. 763-816 (2000); Reskin, supra
note 32, at 236-37.
49. Barbara F. Reskin & Debra B. McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations' Employment of
Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 220-22 (2000). The survey did not ask employers
about the race of their managers, so we could not investigate whether the same effect holds for race, but
from a theoretical standpoint one would expect that it does.
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to identify organizational structures and practices that mediate the biasing
effects of nonconscious cognitive processes.
A. Demographic composition of the work setting
The heterogeneity of the work group influences both the basis on which we
categorize coworkers into in- and outgroups and our likelihood of stereotyping.
The more heterogeneous the work group, the lower the extent of unconscious
stereotyping because in heterogeneous settings we are more likely to have
individuating information about fellow workers. In work groups that are
genuinely diverse, sex and race are less likely to be the basis for ingroup and
outgroup status, and sex- and race-based status groups are less likely to
dominate decisionmaking groups. Thus, the more heterogeneous a work unit's
sex, race, and ethnic composition, the less likely it is that ingroup preference,
outgroup derogation, stereotyping, and attribution error will introduce race and
sex bias into personnel decisions.
Employers may be able to reduce the use of sex or race as the bases of
categorization by making work groups more heterogeneous. Moreover, they
can reinforce the effect of workforce heterogeneity and heighten workers'
identification with work-related groups by encouraging and rewarding
cooperation, and through task interdependence, job rotation, and collective
activities. Integrating workgroups by sex and race reduces the salience of
category distinctions and encourages the individuation of people of another sex
or race.5  Competition between groups, on the other hand, exacerbates
stereotyping by heightening the importance of group membership and because
competition encourages people to use cognitive resources to obtain accurate
information about other members of their own team, while discouraging the
individuation of competitors.
B. Categorization and ingroup favoritism
Organizations can reduce the discriminatory consequences of ingroup
favoritism by categorizing employees on the basis of characteristics that are
independent of their sex and race. Employers can exploit people's ready
attachment to artificially created ingroups, even those based on seemingly
irrelevant criteria, and hence their subjectivity to recategorization, by
supplanting ascriptively defined categories and recategorizing workers in terms
of functional categories that are relevant at the place of work. Such functional
categories include projects, teams, divisions, branches, or even the organization
itself (where the outgroup is its competitors).
50. Brewer & Brown, supra note 18, at 580.
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In addition, cross-cutting assignments should help erode categories and
hence discourage workers and their supervisors from viewing themselves and
others in terms of ascriptively-defined ingroups and outgroups.
5
'
C. Information and stereotyping
Whether stereotyping leads to unequal treatment depends in part on what
information is available to decisionmakers. As noted, when we lack
individuating information about people, our stereotypes automatically come
into play. Thus, employers can check the discriminatory effects of unconscious
cognitive processes by implementing personnel structures which ensure that
decisionmakers have relevant information for all candidates in all personnel
decisions (both decisions involving major events like job assignment or
promotion as well as routine events such as performance evaluation, committee
appointments, or task assignments); that the available information is complete,
objective, concrete, and timely; and that decisionmakers use only information
that is relevant. The formalization of employment practices often involves
explicitly specifying what information is relevant and ensuring that such
information is available. This no doubt helps to account for the positive effect
52of formalized personnel practices on women's share of managerial jobs.
One way that irrelevant "information" enters into personnel decisions is
through the activation of stereotypes. This suggests that the personnel decision
process should be separated from informal conversations, and it cautions
against reminding decisionmakers about diversity immediately before they
make personnel decisions. In contrast, priming egalitarian values appears to
reduce the bias, so cautions about the importance of equal employment
opportunity may be helpful.
Affirmative inclusion is tantamount to outgroup discrimination, and its
effect is discriminatory whenever employment practices give decisionmakers
discretion in selecting occupants for positions or promotions or other career-
enhancing opportunities.
D. Accountability and evaluation bias
Accountability can minimize the biasing effects of ingroup favoritism and
stereotyping. Informing evaluators that they will be held accountable for
making objective, unbiased decisions before they are exposed to the
information on which they will base their judgments reduces both the
expression of bias and bias in nonconscious cognitive processes such as the
51. Id. at 583.
52. Reskin & McBrier, supra note 49, at 220-22.
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encoding of information.5 3 For accountability to make a difference, however, it
must be real, not nominal; in other words, it must be located in an
organizational unit and must include consequences for departing from
prescribed methods. Importantly, time pressure appears to destroy the benefits
of accountability. 54 Thus, employers can reduce the biasing effects of
unconscious cognitive processes by allotting adequate time for personnel
decisions.
E. Race- and gender-conscious personnel practices
A few organizations forestall the discriminatory consequences of their
employees' cognitive processes by implementing affirmative action efforts that
treat the race and sex of underrepresented workers' as plus factors when
choosing among qualified candidates for a position. Race- and gender-
conscious practices include identifying minorities or women who are potential
candidates for management, recruiting at traditionally minority or female
colleges, and evaluating line managers partly on the basis of their achievement
of EEO goals. 55 The explicit pursuit of members of groups excluded by past
personnel practices does not try to minimize the effects of cognitive biases; it
circumvents them. When implemented, such personnel practices increase the
representation of members of excluded groups.
56
VI. EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTROL THE EFFECTS OF
COGNITIVE BIASES
Through their personnel practices organizations are able to limit the
discriminatory effects of their members' automatic cognitive biases. 57 Many, if
not most, organizations fail to prevent the discriminatory consequences of these
biases, however. The reason for this is simple: They don't have to.
5 8
53. Gerald R. Salancik & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Uncertainty, Secrecy, and the Choice of Similar Others,
41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 246-55 (1978); Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and
Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331-76
(1992).
54. Philip E. Tetlock & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Social Contingency Model: Identifying Empirical
and Normative Boundary Conditions on the Error-and-Bias Portrait of Human Nature, in DUAL
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 571-85 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
55. Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linnehan, Formalized HRM Structures: Coordinating Equal
Employment Opportunity or Concealing Organizational Practices? 38 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 787, 815
(1995).
56. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of
Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531-76 (1992); Konrad & Linnehan, supra note 55, at 807; BARBARA
F. RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT 66-69 (1998).
57. Bielby, supra note 17, at 124-27.
58. In addition, it seems safe to argue that most organizations are unaware of the discriminatory
effects of such biases.
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Whether employers implement safeguards to prevent employees'
nonconscious cognitive processes from giving rise to discrimination depends
on the external coercive pressures to do so. 9 When organizations are subject to
genuine pressure from regulatory agencies to comply with anti-discrimination
laws and executive orders, many comply. 60 The consequences of the EEOC's
varying levels of enforcement of Title VII over the past four decades illustrate
this point. Within the powers provided to the EEOC and the limits of its
resources, the agency began an effective attack on race discrimination by the
late 1960s and had chalked up several impressive victories by the early 1970s.
Employers learned during the late 1960s and early 1970s that overt and
pervasive racial discrimination was costly. While job segregation by race
persisted, blacks posted unprecedented gains at work. The EEOC's
enforcement of Title VII helped to narrow the wage gap between blacks and
61whites and reduce job segregation based on race. In contrast, the Commission
dragged its feet for years with respect to sex discrimination, with the
predictable result that the law had little effect on women's access to jobs until
the mid-1970s.62 The changing enforcement climate after Reagan's ascendancy
to the White House provides further evidence that employers respond to the
presence of serious regulatory pressure and backslide when it is absent.6 3
These comparisons reinforce the importance of organizational inertia:
employers rarely change their personnel practices unless they believe that doing
so will be profitable.
In the contemporary regulatory environment, organizations receive mixed
signals regarding the kind of discrimination that Title VII addresses. The long
hiatus in effective enforcement during the Reagan years contributed to
organizations replacing EEO and affirmative action programs with an emphasis
on managing diversity. 64 In the 1990s, however, the OFCCP encouraged
compliance with anti-discrimination regulations by doing "glass ceiling" audits
of federal contractors. Routine reviews of Texaco, Xerox, CoreStates
Financial, and US Airways by the OFCCP led to pay raises for female
employees. Enforcement activities directed at one's own company or at others
in one's industry are powerful motivators for corporate heads to improve
59. Konrad & Linnehan supra note 55, at 807.
60. Reskin, supra note 56, at 66-69.
61. Paul Burstein, Attacking Sex Discrimination in the Labor Market: A Study in Law and Politics,
67 Soc. FORCES 641 (1989).
62. See generally Barbara Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Discrimination: Research Agenda for
the Twenty-First Century, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 319 (2000).
63. See James N. Baron, Brian S. Mittman & Andrew E. Newman, Targets of Opportunity:
Organizational and Environmental Determinants of Gender Integration Within the California Civil
Service, 1979-1985, 96 AM. J. Soc. 1362 (1991) (comparing progress in job integration in Califomia
state agencies that were and were not targeted by the State Personnel Board).
64. Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 42, at 961-62.
2002]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
conditions for women. 65  Proving discrimination in court is another matter,
however, given the conservative judiciary that is Reagan's legacy.66
But, as Edelman observed, the way a social problem is conceived limits the
range of policy responses. 67 Anti-discrimination policies in the U.S. fall short
of the need because they are based on a limited conception of discrimination
that was grounded in the academic and popular understanding of discrimination
in the 1960s-that discrimination was intentional hostile treatment of
individuals based on group membership. Even the expanded definition of
discrimination that includes disparate impact discrimination does not address
the nonintentional discrimination stemming from the automatic cognitive
processes I have discussed.68
What do we do when legal remedies that are based on incomplete
understanding of a social problem cannot address that problem? First, of
course, scholars must assemble persuasive evidence that the available remedies
do not address the problem because the problem was not adequately conceived.
Social scientists and legal scholars have begun to use social cognition research
69to make this case.
Krieger has proposed a two ways for the law to address discrimination
resulting from cognitive distortions. The first is for courts to abandon the
attempt to determine whether an employer's stated reason for some outcome is
genuine or a "pretext". Given the cognitive processes in which people
normally engage, she argued, even reasons that seem to employers to be
genuine may have been influenced by workers' sex or race, thus causally
linking these attributes to the outcome in question.
Krieger further argued for ceasing to equate intention with causality. She
argued that this approach would not require amending Title VII (as amended in
1991), because, according to the statute "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
65. RUTH GILBERT SHAEFFER & EDITH F. LYNTON, CORPORATE EXPERIENCES IN IMPROVING
WOMEN'S JOB OPPORTUNITIES (1979).
66. Barbara Reskin, Discrimination and Its Remedies, in SOURCEBOOK ON LABOR MARKET
RESEARCH: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES (Ivar Berg & Ame Kalleberg eds., 2000).
67. MURRAY J. EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE (1988).
68. In fact, the conservative judiciary appointed during Reagan's and Bush's presidencies have
viewed with skepticism disparate-treatment cases in which evidence showed clear race and gender
animosity. For example, although a plaintiff who charged that her employer refused to train or promote
her because of her sex showed that her supervisor had said, "Fucking women; I hate having fucking
women in the office," the trial and appellate judges treated this as not "direct evidence" of
discrimination, and the plaintiff lost. Heim v. State of Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1993). For
a comprehensive discussion of the inability of discrimination law to reach discrimination resulting from
automatic cognitive processes, see Krieger, supra note 17.
69. See, e.g.. Bielby, supra note 17; Krieger, supra note 17; Reskin, supra note 62; Larry
Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and
Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995); Clark Freshman,
Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify Discrimination and
Promote Coalitions Between "Different'Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313 (2000).
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sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice" [emphasis added]. 70 The
problem is persuading a conservative federal judiciary that the biases inherent
in cognitive processes illegitimately link workers' sex or race with their
employment outcomes. The question, according to Krieger, should not be
whether the employer intended that a person's ascribed status affected an
employment outcome, but only whether it did so. 7' Whenever gatekeepers'
cognitive errors link people's ascriptive characteristics with employment
outcomes, employers would be guilty of unintentional discrimination. Krieger
also favored a two-tier standard for discrimination, modeled after the
Americans Disability in Employment Act, that distinguishes "willful"
discrimination from intentional discrimination, and reserves more serious
penalties for intentional discrimination.
Another model of intervention borrows the idea of "negligence" as a less
serious violation of the law. As Rhode pointed out, a negligence standard
would require decisionmakers to take reasonable steps to minimize biases in
their employment decisions. 72 Distinguishing nonintentional from intentional
discrimination has several advantages. First and foremost, charging one's
employer with or being found guilty of nonintentional discrimination need not
lead to an adversarial procedure in which the employer is implicitly vilified as a
biased person. A no-fault conception of discrimination would free more
victims to approach their employer informally, and to take formal action, things
that few employees do.73 Because such charges are less adversarial, they may
be more amenable to an administrative remedy in which both sides win through
a collective attempt to improve an unsatisfactory situation.7
4
Amending existing laws is an exceedingly slow and, in today's political
climate, highly uncertain process. But-at least within nonhostile presidential
administrations-enforcement agencies have considerable autonomy to
redefine discrimination to encompass the results of normal cognitive processes
and to push for compliance through proactive regulation, including random
audits of employers. Thus, an immediate point of leverage is the administration
of existing anti-discrimination laws and regulations. Importantly, these
regulatory agencies not only operationalize laws and regulations, they are also
the instruments of contact, persuasion, and external pressure on employers to
implement practices that control nonconscious biases.
70. Krieger, supra note 17, at 1243.
71. Id. at 1242.
72. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 163 (1997).
73. See John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STANFORD L. REv. 983, 1004 (1991), on employees' reluctance to sue their employers.
74. Shirley Wilcher, Head of the OFCCP, has often praised reviewed companies for their
cooperation in rectifying discriminatory situations. Frank Swoboda, US Airways Settles "'Glass
Ceiling" Case. WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at E2.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although federal and state regulations restrict employers' right to
discriminate on the basis of workers' sex, race, national origin, and age,
substantial sex and race discrimination nonetheless persists. An important
reason for this persistence is that anti-discrimination interventions assume an
overly narrow conception of discrimination: that it is an intentional (and hence
conscious) act of differential treatment, motivated by the decisionmaker's
antipathy toward a group. 75 In fact, discrimination often constrains workers'
employment opportunities and rewards because basic human cognitive
processes that we neither intend nor of which we are aware link our
perceptions, evaluations, attributions, and recollections of others to their sex
and race.
In addition, concrete discriminatory outcomes often stem from "countless
small acts by a changing cast of characters ... that incrementally and
consistently limit the employment prospects of one group of workers compared
with those of another." 76 When nonconscious cognitions lead decisionmakers
to prefer white men for challenging assignments and work-related social
functions, and when they fail to notice the successes of women and men of
color and white women, the victims may not bother with or even notice
instances of ingroup favoritism.77 Only a termination or, much less often, the
denial of a promotion precipitates legal action, but by then the outgroup
member's accumulated disadvantages make him objectively less qualified.
78
The experience of African American attorney Larry Mungin, chronicled in The
Good Black, illustrates these phenomena. 79  Even if Mungin's employers
harbored no conscious negative feelings toward him based on his race, this did
not alter the fact that partners who lacked objective information about Mungin
were almost certainly swayed by their racial stereotypes. An absence of openly
expressed racial antipathy is relevant only in reducing Mungin's ability to
prevail in a discrimination lawsuit. Ultimately it does not matter whether
employment outcomes result from a single malicious act by a biased individual
or from automatic unintended distortions that an employer has left unchecked
and uncorrected. Either situation causally links race or sex to workers' career
opportunities, and this causal link constitutes discrimination.
Although the automatic cognitive processes discussed here almost always
distort our assessments of people on the basis of their sex, race, ethnicity, and
75. For other explanations of the persistence of discrimination, see generally Reskin, supra note 66.
76. ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS,
MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 241-43 (1999).
77. Krieger, supra note 17, at 1326.
78. A small minority of litigants sue their current employers. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note
73, at 104.
79. PAUL BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK (1999).
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whether they belong to our ingroup, they need not lead to discrimination. That
automatic cognitive distortions sometimes do not give rise to discrimination
reflects the ability of organizational structures to check discrimination. Work
structures and personnel practices can mitigate discriminatory effects by
ensuring that decisions are made on the basis of relevant information and that
decisionmakers do not take into account irrelevant information.
Many employers do not implement effective structures, however, and they
will not do so without external pressure. Enforcement mechanisms under
existing anti-discrimination law may provide an avenue for regulatory agencies
to prompt employers to implement safeguards against the discriminatory results
of nonconscious processes. The argument that regulatory agencies should
coerce employers to check the consequences of intrapsychic processes is likely
to be controversial. However, precedents exist for mandating interventions to
prevent what is otherwise a likely risk to society. For example, laws against
statutory rape, laws specifying an age of consent, and legal decisions on sexual
harassment all try to protect the vulnerable from assumed psychic states in
members of more powerful groups. In other domains we also use structural
remedies to prevent unintended consequences of cognitive processes: The use
of double-blind experiments in scientific research recognizes that we cannot
trust ourselves to remain unbiased. The challenge, as in earlier struggles to
create remedies for discrimination, lies in making the case that discrimination
exists and identifying points for intervention. This essay is a step toward these
ends.
The emergence of a new economy that includes transient and indirect
employment relations, global and hence anonymous employers, deference to
profits, and disregard for workers' rights has exacerbated the erosion of
employment structures that can protect workers from nonconscious as well as
intentional discrimination. These transformations of employment relations and
work structures will almost certainly render workers more vulnerable to race
and sex discrimination. Workers' increasing vulnerability makes correctly
conceptualizing discrimination our first challenge. The second challenge is to
create policy mechanisms that will preserve and expand employment structures
that reduce discriminatory outcomes.
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